Home Care Reform in the Netherlands. Impacts on Unpaid Care by Staveren, I.P. (Irene) van
 1 
 
 
Home Care Reform in the Netherlands:  
Impacts on Unpaid Care 
 
 
 
 
Irene van Staveren 
Institute of Management Research,  
Radboud University Nijmegen and  
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. 
 
 
Comments welcome to: I.vanStaveren@fm.ru.nl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draft paper presented at the ASE sessions at the ASSA meetings, 
San Francisco, 3-5 January 2009. 
 
 2 
Home Care Reform in the Netherlands: Impacts on Unpaid Care 
 
Irene van Staveren 
Institute of Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen and Institute of Social 
Studies, The Hague. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the Netherlands, about half a million people make use of home care, that is, formally 
arranged, and publicly financed home care services. Until 1 January 2007, Dutch home 
care provisioning used to be supplied by relatively small, profit and non-profit home care 
organizations. The majority of home care organizations catered for only one town or 
region, and only since a few years, some organizations have merged, within and across 
regions, in a strategic move to prepare for the 2007 market liberalization policy. Home 
care was financed through national level social insurance and allocated at the national 
level through local home care providers. The demand for home care has increased 
steadily over the past years, largely due to the aging population, while increased demand 
is also due to a steady increase in female labour force participation, which puts pressure 
on the availability of unpaid home care1. Nevertheless, the level of unpaid care is very 
high in the Netherlands, compared with other European countries, as Bettio and 
Plantenga (2004) have shown with their care index for European countries. The increased 
demand for home care has resulted in waiting lists for home care already since the 1990s.  
Since the first of January 2007, a new social support law, the WMO2, has been 
implemented which includes a structural reform of the household services of home care 
in its supply, organization, and financing, towards more market liberalization. The WMO 
                                                 
1
 According to a European comparative study by Francesca Bettio and Janneke Plantenga, 15 percent of 
Dutch women do not participate in the labour force because of caring responsibilities, while 11 percent of 
working women work part-time because of caring responsibilities (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004, figure 7). 
2
 WMO is the acronym for the Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning, or social support law, which includes 
a variety of forms of social support of which household care as part of home care is the largest part, also in 
financial terms. 
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has created a split between personal care and care for the household: whereas personal 
care still belongs to the national level responsibility, care for the household is now 
delegated to municipalities. This paper will concentrate on care for the household within 
home care3. Home care in this narrow sense includes tasks such as cleaning, doing 
grocery shoppings, preparing meals, washing clothes and washing dishes (in Dutch 
policy referred to as level one, or HHV1), and, at the organizational level, help with the 
organization of the household or help with preparing meals (referred to as level two, or 
HHV2). The objective of the WMO is to support the social participation of all citizens. 
For the home care sector, this objective implies that everyone is entitled to home care 
services at an affordable rate and at least the same level of quality as before, within a 
reasonable period of time. A secondary objective is to make the home care sector more 
efficient, with the expectation that market liberalization will end waiting lists, reduce 
costs, and improve quality of care. A major characteristic of this home care reform in the 
Netherlands is decentralization towards municipalities. One year after its implementation, 
complaints by clients, suppliers, care workers and parliamentarians, have led the Ministry 
of Health to revise the law in two ways in order to counteract strategic behavior by home 
care organizations following the 2007 change of law4. The first revision implies that 
home care organizations are no longer allowed to supply home care through contracted 
services by workers who have no labour contract and for which, as a consequence, the 
client should take employer’s responsibility. This revision eliminates unwanted employer 
risk for clients who prefer to receive home care in natura, and also helps to stop the 
tendency by home care organizations to substitute employees by flex workers without 
labour contract. The second change entails the requirement that home care organizations 
should indicate in their tenders how they would provide job opportunities for employees 
of home care organizations that do not gain a contract in the competitive tender process at 
municipal level. This second revision seeks to protect home care workers’ jobs and 
prevent a shift of care workers to other sectors of the labour market, which would imply a 
loss of human capital for the home care sector.  
                                                 
3
 Henceforth, ‘home care’ in this paper will refer to the household care part of home care services. 
According to a study using a survey carried out at the end of the 1990s, about 25% of all home care 
receivers received only household care, most others a combination of home care services including 
household care (van Campen and Woittiez, 2003). 
4
 See letter by the government 15-02-2008 ‘Wijziging WMO: versterking positie client in WMO’. 
 4 
 This paper has two objectives. First, it will provide an overview of the household 
home care reform in the Netherlands and the impacts as they appear in evaluation studies 
available to date. Second, the paper will analyze the impacts of the legal change on 
unpaid home care. The empirical analysis is based on a survey carried out in a major 
Dutch city, Rotterdam, among unpaid home carers. The paper will end with a conclusion. 
 
 
The Dutch home care reform 
 
The current home care reform is the most recent stage in a process that started already in 
the late 1980s. From then onwards, home care was gradually moved away from the 
public sector to the market, with a gradually declining level of regulation. First, home 
care organizations were privatized into non-profit, non-state organizations. This was soon 
followed by an ongoing process of mergers and acquisitions of home care organizations 
and the rationalization of home care in a Taylorist way (Ipenburg, 1999), leading to lists 
of detailed caring tasks with maximum minutes to be spent per client per task. Later, new 
entrants were allowed on the home care market, including for-profit suppliers of 
household home care. At the same time, labour contracts were slowly becoming flexible 
across the sector, with an increasing group of workers having no labour contract at all – 
having been shifted to become own account workers on service contracts (so called 
alpha-helps, low skilled home care workers). This has created social unrest in the sector 
and regular political debates on efficiency and equity in home care, as I have documented 
earlier (van Staveren, 1999). Currently, 57% of workers in Dutch home care work in 
household care (120,000 persons, of which 46% part-time): 55,000 alpha helps (who 
have no labour contract), 44,000 household home carers, and 20,000 home carers who 
used to combine household care with basic personal care tasks. This last category of 
workers has not been hired anymore since 2007 for household care tasks, because they 
are more expensive (overqualified) than the other two labour categories for household 
care. 
In 1995, clients were given the choice between home care in natura, from a home 
care organization, and home care provided by anyone they preferred to contract (allowing 
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for hiring family members), through the allocation of a personal budget. The assessment 
of home care needs, which used to be done by the same organizations which 
subsequently provided the care, were shifted to independent assessment agencies5. A 
major motivation behind this sequence of home care reforms was the assumption that a 
substantial share of increased health care costs in the Netherlands is caused by 
inefficiencies in health care provisioning (Kooreman, 1994). Throughout the period of 
reforms, demand kept on increasing steadily while waiting lists for home care persisted or 
even lengthened (van Campen and Woittiez, 2003).  
 The 2007 reform is the latest step in market liberalization of the Dutch home care 
sector – at least, the household care part of home care. The core of the reform is 
decentralization combined with competitive tendering. This has made municipal 
governments responsible for the following three tasks: 
1) Creation of a competitive market through a (European) tender process; the 
municipality awards contracts to the most competitive suppliers and selects at 
least 3 suppliers per municipality for providing home care in natura. 
2) Arrange for the decision making on the allocation of care per client through a 
municipal or regional assessment agency 
3) Allocate individual budgets to clients or allocate resources per client to home care 
providers from a municipal budget, through the intermediary of care agencies 
4) Monitor the quality of home care in relation to the objective of the WMO to 
guarantee participation in society for everyone. 
 
One of the most striking results of the Dutch home care reform in just one year time is 
that the market has resulted in a much stronger cost reduction than was expected. The 
municipalities were given a total amount of roughly 1 billion euro for 2007. This budget 
was the same as it was at central level in 2006, which in turn had not changed since 2005, 
whereas estimates are that demand had increased 10% between 2005 and 2006 (SP, 
2007). Now it appears that the municipalities have spent only 800 million euro of the 
                                                 
5
 The procedure of allocation to individual clients has improved just before the WMO: the CIZ (Centre for 
Indications in Health) has been evaluated as functioning quicker and more in a uniform way in 2006 
compared to previous years and the previous system (Peeters and Francke, 2007). It is unknown whether 
there are changes in the effectiveness of the CIZ since 2006. 
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budget (Volkskrant 13/02/08)6, making a saving of 20%. Under the pressure of fierce 
competition, home care organizations have offered their services well below the prices of 
previous years (on average 12% which in some cases even implies reductions up to 30% 
according to FAOT, 2007) while some organizations have admitted that they offered 
prices below the cost price. A number of large home care organizations are currently 
under threat of bankruptcy, including the two major ones in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. 
The provisioning of home care is means tested at the household level. This 
implies that clients are required to pay a contribution, depending on their own and 
partner’s income. Also the personal budget, or PGB, is means-tested. The contribution to 
be paid from one’s own income has increased considerably in 2007. This is caused by the 
WMO’s equalizing of budgets for people who receive care in natura and those who 
receive care through a PGB (Volkskrant, 16/01/08). Before the WMO, PGB holders paid 
maximally 60% of the home care costs and used the rest for administrative purposes, now 
municipalities require them to pay the full 100% and hence finance the administrative 
costs on their own account (which they can outsource to the national security bank, SVB, 
without extra cost). This particularly hits those with higher incomes, but even for those 
with a modal income (30,000 euro gross annual income) less than 3 hrs home care 
through PGB is just as expensive as hiring a domestic help on the market without a PGB. 
In 2006, 85,000 people in the Netherlands organized their health care through a PGB, of 
which 55,000 bought household home care. One third of those who use a PGB hire 
someone from their own social network, such as family members or friends (Invoering 
WMO, 2006a). 
 
 
 
Overview of relevant literature 
 
An important part of home care is informal care by relatives, friends and neighbours. A 
couple of studies have analyzed the impact of home care reform on the substitution 
between formal (paid) home care and unpaid home care. Bolin, Lindgren and Lundborg 
                                                 
6
 The Ministry of Health is analyzing what has happened to the other 200million euro.  
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(2007) report that a variety studies have estimated that about 80% of care for the elderly 
in Europe consists of informal care. Their own empirical study finds that formal and 
informal home care are substitutes, whereas informal care is complementary to other 
forms of elderly care, such as doctor visits. For Canada, Stabile, Laporte and Coyte 
(2006) also found substitution between formal and informal home care. They also looked 
at characteristics of unpaid care givers and found no relationship with income, nor with a 
working spouse in the household of the care giver. But they did find more women, and 
those with higher education or less working hours per week more likely to provide unpaid 
home care. An older, US-based study, had found only a small reduction in informal home 
care in response to an increase in formal home care provisioning (Pezzin, Kemper and 
Reschovsky, 1996). It did find, however, that the more generous formal home care 
services allowed single elderly persons to live at home for a longer period of time.  
In the Netherlands, unpaid home carers tend to provide four times as much care as 
paid home care in the Netherlands (Schadé and Dokter, 1995). Also here, substitution 
effects have been found as well as complementarity (Mur-Veenman et al., 1993). In a 
study on the allocation of home care over the 1992-1996 period, using a large sample of 
clients (n = 7732), researchers found that in 42 percent of the cases, unpaid care was 
provided alongside paid home care (van Campen and Woittiez, 2003). In a study on care 
in nursing homes, Kooreman (1994) found that voluntary care has a positive effect on 
nursing homes’ efficiency. It may well be that a similar efficiency effect is generated by 
unpaid care in the home care sector. Because of this possibility, Algera (2005) advises 
that needs assessment reports should take the quantity and quality of unpaid care into 
account, whereas home care policy should provide more support for unpaid carers.  
 According to a detailed study for the year 2001, unpaid care appears to provide 
complementary care to paid home care, as measured by a significant gap between 
demand and supply of home care (Algera, 2005). In particular, for two thirds of 
chronically ill clients, there is a gap between their self-expressed needs for home care and 
the quantity and quality of paid home care received. At the same time, unpaid care also 
substitutes for formal care. The same study shows that there is also a gap between the 
needs assessment and the care actually delivered to clients. One third of chronically ill 
clients receives less formal home care than they are entitled to according to the formal 
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needs assessment, implying that home care organizations do not provide the necessary 
hours and/or quality or types of home care in accordance with the independent needs 
assessment (idem).  
 The city of Rotterdam pays attention in its WMO policy 2008-2010 to unpaid 
home care, or mantelzorg in Dutch. Its budget for support and coordination of mantelzorg 
and organized voluntary care is 718,000 euro per year, which is one percent of the 
municipal WMO budget, which is taken up for 95% by paid home care services 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007a). Rotterdam also has a policy framework document for the 
support of unpaid home carers, or mantelzorgers (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007b). This 
document mentions an estimation of the economic value of mantelzorg in Rotterdam of 1 
billion euro per year, calculated by multiplying the time spent by the 60,000 
mantelzorgers who are active in the city with the lowest home care rate for household 
help (idem, p. 6 and p. 15). The municipal policy includes emergency home care in case a 
mantelzorger is unable to continue his/her task. In order to support mantelzorgers, 
Rotterdam has set up 13 support centers, which are, however, only in contact with a total 
of 1200 mantelzorgers, which is 5% of all estimated mantelzorgers in the city. The 
problem is indeed how to reach these people whose work is so invisble. Concrete policy 
measures still have to be worked out but are envisaged to consist of the following 
measures (idem, pp. 22-23): 
- quick respite care 
- supply of domotica  (ICT appliances) and home adjustments 
- aids for daily care 
- courses to reduce physical burdens in home care tasks 
- shopping help 
- extra child care 
- administrative help 
- free parking 
- (electronic) contact groups 
- after care for mantelzorgers when the person they care for has died or moved to 
institutional care 
- connection to an electronic network of voluntary home carers 
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The policy framework promises extra money to develop and implement these policy 
measures. 
At national level, the parliament deliberates over a proposal to financially 
compensate mantelzorgers with 250 euro per year for mantelzorges who spend at least 
eight hours per week on unpaid home care during at least six months (idem, p. 32). 
 
 
Unpaid Home Care in Rotterdam: a Small Preliminary Survey 
 
None of the recent partial evaluation reports on the 2007 home care reform has paid 
much attention to possible negative impacts on unpaid home care by family members, 
neighbours, friends, and volunteers. This section of the paper therefore reports of a 
survey which I have carried out in Rotterdam, the country’s second largest city. Among 
the reasons for selecting Rotterdam is that this municipality has developed a policy for 
unpaid care givers and has set up a network of 13 local support centers for unpaid carers. 
The municipality’s policy paper justifies its policy not only because it fits well with the 
WMO but also because research had shown that in Rotterdam there is a relatively large 
group of unpaid home carers who indicate that they experience their care giving task as 
very hard. 1800 mantelzorgers have indicated to feel overburdened while 4500 
mantelzorgers have indicated that they feel heavily burdened with their unpaid home care 
task (Gemeente Rotterdam 2007b: 9). A final reason for selecting Rotterdam is that the 
traditionally largest home care organization, with a 85% market share, was not awarded a 
contract in 2007.  
 Of the 150 surveys sent out, only 46 came back, of which 39 were usable. 16 
mantelzorgers report that the person they care for also receives paid home care, whereas 
22 report that there is no paid home care. In 21 cases, the person cared for does not live in 
the same household, in 17 cases the mantelzorger and person cared for are part of the 
same household, while in most of the cases the person cared for is the partner. The 
average age of the person cared for is 69, whereas the average age of the mantelzorger is 
65. Most mantelzorgers are women: 28 out of the 35 who filled in this question, while 
most of them are in relatively good health condition. Most respondents were pensioners 
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(22), 7 received a welfare benefit, 4 were housewives, while 6 earned an income of their 
own. 37 mantelzorgers started their unpaid home care already before 2007. 
Concerning the policy change of 2007, several questions were asked about 
changes in paid home care and unpaid home care. 7 out of 21 report that paid home care 
hours have increased over the past year, 2 say that it has decreased, whereas 12 say that it 
has remained the same. Those who report that paid home care has increased all say that 
the municipality has increased the number of hours after a new needs assessment. For 
those cared for who do not receive any paid home care, there is a variety of reasons: 4 
state that the municipality did not allocate paid home care because of a lack of need or 
the presence of sufficient mantelzorg, 2 indicated that arranging a PGB is too 
complicated, whereas most report they do not know why the person they care for does not 
receive paid home care.  
 The tasks of mantelzorgers are diverse and most of them carry out more than one 
task, the average number of tasks per mantelzorger is 4. 7 mantelzorgers even do 7, 8 or 9 
tasks. Interestingly, 4 out of these 7 indicated that the person they care for does also 
receive paid home care. Apparently, paid home care is too limited in relation to the care 
burden of the mantelzorger. Diagram 1 below shows the frequency of tasks mentioned by 
35 mantelzorgers. The diagram shows that the most common tasks are help with 
administration, functional support, household help, personal care, and transport.  
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Diagram 1. 
Unpaid home care tasks
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The next diagram shows the time use per task for mantelzorgers. As expected, staying 
with the person cared for is the most time consuming activity, with an average of 54 
hours per week per mantelzorger. Household help takes up on average 12 hours per week 
and 20 mantelzorgers indicate that they do household tasks. Out of these 20, 12 
mantelzorgers do household help whereas there is also paid home care, that is, paid 
household care provided by a home care organization or an individual hired through a 
personal budget. Apparently, the household help provided by the municipality is not 
deemed adequate. The average time use across tasks is 44 hours per mantelzorger per 
week, which is more than a Dutch fulltime paid working week. On third, or 13 out of 36 
mantelzorgers indicate that their time use has increased since the WMO, with an average 
time increase of 1.5 hours. The tasks which are most often mentioned as requiring more 
time are household care, functional support and personal care.  
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Diagram 2 
Time use per task
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The increase in household care may be related to the change since the WMO from more 
skilled to lower skilled household help by home care organizations, which is a cheaper 
category of household care. The increased unpaid personal care may be related to the 
disconnection since the WMO in the financing of personal care – still financed at national 
level and not made competitive – and decentralized household care. It his now no longer 
possible for mantelzorgers and those who they care for to decide on shifts between the 
two categories within the same budget. An implication is that those mantelzorgers who 
left personal care, such as bathing, to a professional and did other tasks such as household 
care, have to take up personal care tasks when the care allocation is now only for 
household tasks and no longer for personal care. Not all care receivers and mantelzorgers 
like the idea of bathing someone when the relationship is between parent (care receiver) 
and child (care giver), for example. Hence, choice has been reduced here. 
On the changes of the WMO on the burden of unpaid home care, 50%, 17 our of 
32 mantelzorgers, state that their caring task has become heavier, while 14 report no 
change. Two reasons were mentioned most often (each seven times) for the heavier 
unpaid care burden: when the care receiver’s condition deteriorates, the municipality does 
not allocate more household help, nor more of other forms of home care. For the 
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mantelzorger, the unpaid care burden results in various limitations. Diagram 3 below 
gives an overview of these. The diagram shows that leisure and social contacts suffer 
most, but also hobbies, care for one’s own household as well as sufficient hours of sleep 
are affected by the increased unpaid care burden. Overall, half (15 out of 28 respondents) 
state that these limitations have become stronger since the WMO, whereas 11 replied that 
they have remained the same, and only two have responded that they have become less 
constraining. 
 
 
 
Diagram 3. 
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The tentative conclusions that can be drawn from the preliminary survey, keeping in 
mind the small sample size, is that irrespective of whether a care receiver receives paid 
home care, the burden of unpaid care givers seems high, on average more than 40 hours 
per week. The unpaid care burden seems to have increased since the WMO, although not 
so much in hours per week (1.5) but more so in complexity and heaviness of burdens. 
The split between household home care and other forms of care such as personal care has 
reduced choice, because shifts in these tasks between paid and unpaid home carers are no 
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longer possible. Although the WMO concerns the household care part of home care, 
unpaid care givers still often do household care, which may have become heavier due to a 
shift in care providers from higher to lower skilled workers, which in turn is a likely 
result of the fierce competition for contracts with municipalities. The increased burden of 
unpaid carers also is paralleled by stronger limitations for other activities, in particular for 
leisure and socials contacts. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The literature review and small survey suggest a few negative impacts of Dutch 
competitive tendering in home care. First, it did save money and did not reduce access, 
but it is unclear how the 20% budget saving has been spent and whether it has been spent 
on meeting the purposes of the WMO law at all. Second, the competitive tendering seems 
to have resulted in lower quality of services due to less skilled and more flexible labour, 
while the costs for those clients on a personal budget have increased. Third, client choice 
seems to have reduced due to the impossibility to substitute between paid and unpaid care 
between categories of home care, such as household care and personal care, and due to 
the pressure by home care organizations to use a personal budget, with subsequent 
employer risk, rather than home care in natura. Fourth, the recent adaptations to the law 
to prevent suppliers to force non-contract workers on clients and to force suppliers to take 
up workers of organizations that lost a contract are likely to bring the offered prices back 
to the original sectoral average, eliminating the price reduction of the competitive 
process. The question that arises whether there was much inefficiency in home care 
production in the first place, and if there was, whether it was in wage cost or perhaps 
somewhere else, such as in home care management and organizational costs, assessment 
procedures, and the bureaucratic resource transfer mechanism. Moreover, the competitive 
tendering procedure has increased marketing costs as well as the administrative costs for 
participating in tendering procedures for home care suppliers. Finally, it seems that there 
are direct consequences of the reduced quality and choice for clients on unpaid home 
carers: they indicate that their burden has become heavier, even when the persons they 
care for receive paid household home care and receive increased hours of help when they 
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are re-assessed after a deterioration of their condition. This does not only call for a good 
unpaid home care policy, as the city of Rotterdam is for example developing, but also for 
a re-thinking of the paid home care reform, as it now seems that the enormous and 
unexpected ‘efficiency gain’ was in fact mostly a quality reduction based on reducing 
labour cost, with a negative impact both on paid and on unpaid carers. 
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